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Introduction 
The data are in: even after more than a decade of experience with United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (SCR) 1325,1 women have only made marginal gains of inclusion in, and 
influence upon, peace processes and the reconstruction efforts that follow. While the U.N. has 
repeatedly renewed its commitment to “mainstream” gender, most notably with its 
Millennium Goals,2 and through Security Council resolutions acknowledging the importance 
of integrating women into international peace and security objectives,3 these exhortations 
have thus far had little substantive or transformative effect on women’s lives in post-conflict 
zones. 
The post-conflict terrain, at least theoretically, provides multiple opportunities for 
transformation on many different levels: protecting civilians, providing accountability for 
human rights violations committed during hostilities, reforming local and national laws, 
reintegrating soldiers, rehabilitating and providing redress for victims, establishing or re-
establishing the rule of law, creating human rights institutions and new governance 
structures, altering cultural attitudes, improving socioeconomic conditions, and transforming 
gender roles and women’s status. This Article explores the effort to make gender central in 
the various legal and political regimes and processes in operation post-conflict, and 
specifically reviews SCR 13254 and its successor resolutions to assess their real contributions 
towards achieving gender centrality. Section I introduces the significance of gender in the 
conflict and post-conflict context, while Section II turns to the U.N.’s efforts to address gender 
in a series of Security Council resolutions, beginning with SCR 1325 in 2000, and evaluates 
the relationship of these efforts to concepts of gender security applied in the aftermath of 
conflict. Section III explores how the resolutions have been implemented, reviewing both 
country specific resolutions developed in an attempt to foster compliance with SCRs, as well 
as the approach of various nations in preparing their national action plans (NAPs) that 
establish goals for putting the resolutions into practice. Section III then provides examples of 
post-conflict, field-based activities undertaken in the years after passage of SCR 1325 and 
some of its successors to illustrate the impact (or lack thereof) of the resolutions on 
peacekeeping, and humanitarian and post-conflict operations in the field. Section IV sets out 
recommendations for moving forward and concludes that while the resolutions may offer 
some major momentum in creating a normative framework for building gender concerns into 
                                                                                                                               
 1. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).  
 2. See DEV. INDICATORS UNIT, U .N. STATISTICS DIV., OFFICIAL LIST OF MDG INDICATORS (2008), 
available at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Attach/Indicators/OfficialList2008.pdf. The 
Millennium Development Goals come from the Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000), and from further agreement by member states at the 2005 World 
Summit, resulting in adoption of General Assembly Resolution 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 
2005). 
 3. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 1, at 2 (articulating “the urgent need to mainstream a gender 
perspective into peacekeeping operations”). See also, infra discussion at Part II.A, detailing 
successor Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960 and their articulations of 
women’s security.  
 4. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 1.  
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most aspects of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding plans and processes, they 
have done little, as yet, to centralize women in these same processes. 
Ultimately, this analysis shows that there has, indeed, been some change in rhetoric and 
practice, such that women are now hailed as more central to conflict and post-conflict 
processes than they were ten years ago. Moreover, notwithstanding the not inconsequential 
difficulty of legally enforcing the resolutions, the rhetoric has also affected norms on the 
ground and is influencing, for example, the desire of international organizations to include 
women in order to partner with the U.N. The normative shifts have also had a cascade effect, 
impacting the strategies employed at the national level to include or centralize women.5 
Nevertheless, though the rhetoric has resulted in minimal improvements, most clearly visible 
in the response to sexual violence, women still remain largely peripheral to the vast majority 
of post-conflict processes and institutions.  
I.  The Significance of Addressing Gender and Focusing on Women 
In the past thirty years, the international institutional infrastructure (comprised of the 
U.N. and other international agencies and donors) has sought to respond to intra-state, and, 
more frequently, inter-state, conflict through interventions designed to secure peace and 
advance related goals, including regional security, economic stability and the recognition of 
human rights for all individuals. The process of “securing” peace has no bright lines or 
demarcations, and so guaranteeing the immediate peace often leads to a longer-term phase of 
stabilizing the country through post-conflict reconstruction processes and development. This 
Article focuses on these post-conflict processes.6 Decisions about what is included in, or left 
out of, post-conflict reconstruction processes are often made early during the peace 
negotiation phases.7 It is important, therefore, to review the entire continuum—from 
peacekeeping and peacemaking through post-conflict peacebuilding—and the resolutions that 
apply, albeit differently, to each of these various phases of intervention, in order to assess the 
resolutions’ impact. 
Societies rarely have the opportunity to revisit and remake their basic social, political, and 
legal compact. Such potentially transformative moments are so rare that their occurrence 
helps explain our preoccupation with societies emerging from conflict.8 It also explains why 
                                                                                                                               
 5. See, e.g., KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011) (discussing the interface between international and national 
norms). 
 6. From 1960 to 2008, 112 countries have been primary parties to one or more conflicts. UN WOMEN, 
PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2011–2012: IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 89 (2011) [hereinafter UN 
WOMEN’S 2011–2012 PROGRESS REPORT], available at http://progress.unwomen.org/pdfs/EN-Report-
Progress.pdf.  
 7. FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, DINA FRANCESCA HAYNES & NAOMI CAHN, ON THE FRONTLINES: GENDER, 
WAR, AND THE POST-CONFLICT PROCESS intro. & chs. 1, 2, 4 (2011) [hereinafter ON THE 
FRONTLINES]. 
 8. Conflict can provide women with opportunities to break out of stereotypes and stifling 
societal patterns. . . If women seize these opportunities, transformation is possible. The 
challenge is to protect the seeds of transformation sown during the upheaval and to use 
them to grow the transformation in the transitional period of reconstruction.  
 UN WOMEN’S 2011–2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 6, at 81 (quoting Anu Pillay). 
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feminists and other critical thinkers view such opportunities as particularly important to 
groups that have been marginalized, underrepresented, and discriminated against. 
Historically, the actors involved in responding to violent conflict, securing peace, and 
reconstructing nations torn apart by conflict have failed to take into account at least half of 
the population of any given country—women. Recent combined legal and political efforts on 
multiple fronts, including treaty recognition of gender-based violence,9 robust jurisprudence 
from regional human rights treaties, and embedded policy initiatives through U.N. agencies 
(some newly created to address these issues)10 have given rise to a larger discussion about the 
impact of conflict on women as a distinct group. Over the past half century, international 
actors, including and sometimes led by U.N. agencies specifically tasked with assessing the 
condition and status of women (e.g., UNIFEM)11 and those most often working with women 
as the affected population (e.g., UNHCR),12 began recognizing that women were excluded 
from many of the processes devised to end conflict and secure peace. From there, it was a 
short leap to concluding that concrete steps needed to be taken to ensure the inclusion of 
women. 
A. The Woman Question 
In commenting on nascent efforts by the international community to engineer post-conflict 
processes aimed towards improving women’s lives, we are mindful of the critiques that focus 
on westerners inserting themselves into the role of “savior” while viewing locals caught in 
conflict—particularly women—as “victims,” and telling the local population how to move 
forward.13 Indeed, those who control and shape these processes, including state and non-state 
as well as international institutional actors, have often systematically erased women as 
                                                                                                                               
 9. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
 10. UN Women was formed in 2010 as a super-agency dedicated to issues impacting women. In its first 
report, the agency listed as indicators of progress for women suffrage, recognized by only two 
countries in 1911 and now “virtually universal” (signifying political rights) and the signing of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women by 186 countries 
(signifying attention to economic, social, and cultural rights); the report also noted, however, 
widespread economic and labor insecurity, bias in legal systems, gender-based violence and 
insufficient health care as ongoing and pervasive gendered concerns. UN WOMEN’S 2011–2012 
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 6, at 8–9.  
 11. United Nations Development Fund for Women [UNIFEM], now part of UN Women, was founded in 
1976. About UNIFEM, UN WOMEN, http://www.unifem.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2012). 
 12. UNHCR works with refugee populations, and women comprise a majority of most refugee 
populations. See, e.g., Susan Harris Rimmer, Reconceiving Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons as Transitional Justice Actors (UNHCR Policy Dev. & Evaluation Serv. New Issues in 
Refugee Research Series, Research Paper No. 187, 2010), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4bbb2a589.pdf. See also, UNHCR: Majority of Syrian Refugees Are Women, 
Children, DAILY STAR LEBANON (June 2, 2012), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-
News/2012/Jun-02/175450-unhcr-majority-of-syrian-refugees-are-women-
children.ashx#axzz2AzkswD72. 
 13. See Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 201 (2001), for more on the savages/victims/saviors paradigm. See also Dina Francesca Haynes, 
The Deus ex Machina Descends: The Laws, Priorities and Players Central to the International 
Administration of Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, in DECONSTRUCTING THE 
RECONSTRUCTION 3 (Dina Francesca Haynes ed., 2008), for more on critiques of heavy handed post-
conflict interventions. 
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participants and agents from the post-conflict picture. “Native” women can be marginalized in 
the post-conflict processes and have, consequently, undertaken sometimes-extraordinary 
efforts to become visible to the decisionmakers in such contexts.14 Given the tenuousness of 
these transitional moments, however, it is critical to take advantage of the potential to create 
and capture improvements for women that might otherwise never exist. 
While heavy-handed interventionist approaches have obvious drawbacks (lacking, for 
example, legitimacy and longevity unless there is local ownership and “buy in,” and 
sometimes women seem to fare worse after intervention as with Iraqi women post-Saddam),15 
not intervening at all, doing so too softly, or placing “women’s issues” too far down on the 
agenda of intervention and post-conflict priorities also bears significant risk. Inaction could 
leave women at a loss for substantial rights protection at a time when the rights of 
individuals in conflict sites are most likely to be considered and formulated or reformulated.16 
Placing women’s concerns too far down on the negotiation agenda also risks retrenchment of 
women’s often culturally and socially devalued position as soon as external funding and 
attention falls away. Into this balancing act must also go the recognition that local 
conceptions of gender issues may differ from those articulated by international organizations. 
Even when they are acknowledged, “women’s issues” can be used as a pretext for achieving 
an ulterior motive through international intervention.17 When international actors do notice 
womens’ efforts to be included and acknowledge their obligations to assist with that inclusion, 
there is a risk of shunting women into soft roles as participants within civil society rather 
than at the negotiation table itself.18 In the post-conflict context, there are risks to women 
from both sides—from acting without ample reflection and awareness, and in failing to act at 
all. But the possibility that the transitional moment might favorably impact women’s status 
and opportunity balances in favor of reflective action. 
B. Why the Woman Question is Key in the Post-Conflict Context 
Women’s exclusion from the post-conflict process and the need to focus on centralizing 
gender emerges from the following data points on women’s status, ranging from women’s 
economic situations to their roles during and after conflict: 
                                                                                                                               
 14. See Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 509 
(2010).  
 15. See also Haynes, supra note 13, at 13 (discussing “governance by fiat”).  
 16. See, e.g., Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, A Country of Their Own: Women and Peacebuilding, 28 
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 522, 524 (2011) (“UN operations can do better to ensure successful 
long-term peace than purely domestic alternatives and international involvement without the 
UN.”). 
 17. As women have long noted, it is unjust to ignore women’s oppression for years and then cite it only 
when preparing to launch an intervention sought for other reasons. Id.; Statement by Women 
Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) (on file with author). See also Ava Emaz, How the West Uses 
Women’s Rights as an Excuse for Military Intervention, THIS MAGAZINE (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://this.org/magazine/2012/02/17/how-the-west-uses-women%E2%80%99s-rights-as-an-excuse-
for-military-intervention/ (noting that First Lady Laura Bush initiated a campaign in November, 
2001, bringing attention to the plight of women in Afghanistan to garner support for the war). 
 18. ON THE FRONTLINES, supra note 7, at ch. 10. 
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• Women comprise 64% of the population of illiterate adults in the world.19 
• More than one woman in three lives in a low-income country.20 
• In low-income countries, maternal and perinatal conditions and diseases account 
for 38% of women’s deaths.21 
• Only 19% of national-level parliamentarians and legislators are women,22 but 
post-conflict Rwanda has the largest percentage of women in parliament in the 
world.23 
• In 2009, after years of working on gender parity, women comprised 38.3% of staff 
in the U.N. Secretariat, but only 27.3% at the D-1 (Senior) level and above.24 
• Women make up the majority of the world’s unemployed, and are laid-off and 
fired at a much higher rate than men during and after political and economic 
transitions.25 
• Only 2.5% of signatories to major peace agreements since 1992 were women.26 
• 70% of casualties in recent conflicts were civilian non-combatants and the 
majority of those were women and children.27 
• There is “a pattern of gender differentiation at all stages of a disaster: exposure to 
risk, risk perception, preparedness, response, physical impact, psychological 
impact, recovery and reconstruction.”28 
• Women report conflict-related rape and sexual slavery, forced displacement, and 
abduction in numbers far exceeding those of men.29 
• Women make up the majority of refugees and displaced persons.30 
                                                                                                                               
 19. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., FACTSHEET: GENDER EQUALITY 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/mdg-factsheets/genderfactsheet.pdf. 
 20. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WOMEN AND HEALTH: TODAY’S EVIDENCE, TOMORROW’S AGENDA 4 (2009), 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241563857_eng.pdf. 
 21. Id. at 8. 
 22. Women in National Parliaments, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/world300610.htm. In Nordic countries women comprise on average 
42% of the parliament, while in Arab states, they average 9%. Id.  
 23. World Classification, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION (June 30, 2010), http://ipu.org/wmn-
e/arc/classif300610.htm (establishing that post-conflict gender attentiveness (such as the institution 
of quotas and mandatory placement on party lists) works with respect to putting women in office). 
The statistic does not, however, tell us about the actual power of those women to effect change. 
 24. U.N. OFFICE OF THE FOCAL POINT FOR WOMEN, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
SYSTEM AND IN THE SECRETARIAT 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/ianwge/Factsheet%20as%20of%20FEB%202010.pdf.  
 25. GEORGINA WAYLEN, ENGENDERING TRANSITIONS: WOMEN’S MOBILIZATION, INSTITUTIONS AND 
GENDER OUTCOMES 181–82 (2007). 
 26. UNIFEM, WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PRESENCE 
AND INFLUENCE 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/0302_WomensParticipationInPeaceNegotiations_en.p
df (based on a “reasonably representative sample of 24 major peace processes since 1992”). 
 27. UNIFEM, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN—FACTS AND FIGURES 6 (2007), 
http://www.unifem.org/attachments/gender_issues/violence_against_women/facts_figures_violence_a
gainst_women_2007.pdf.  
 28. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Women, Vulnerability, and Humanitarian Emergencies, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 1, 12 (2011) (quoting WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GENDER AND HEALTH IN DISASTERS 1 
(2002)). 
 29. UN WOMEN’S 2011–2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 6, at 83.  
 30. Id. at 84. 
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• Some conflict-related violence is aimed at, or results in, girls not being able to 
attend school, which perpetuates generations of disempowered women.31 
• Up to 40% of child soldiers are girls, and women are associated with armed 
groups in a variety of roles ranging from soldiers to cooks to forced sex 
participants and coerced prostitutes. 32 
These statistics show that although women are present during war—as refugees, as 
workers, as soldiers, as mothers—they are only nominally present in the public arena during 
processes directed at stabilizing their countries. Because significant empirical and field-
sourced evidence suggests that this essential step will promote broader stability, women’s 
inclusion ought to be a raison d’etre of international involvement in conflicts and their 
resolutions. Where women are insecure, children, families, communities, and political 
structures are also insecure. 
II.  The U.N.’s Gender Resolutions 
In recognition of the centrality of women to promoting peace, the U.N. Security Council 
has established a goal to “mainstream” women into post-conflict processes. To further this 
goal, it passed Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 and five subsequent “women related” 
Security Council resolutions, with the objective of broadening the scope and encouraging the 
implementation of SCR 1325. In this Section we first review those SCRs, looking to identify 
the Security Council’s objectives and then evaluate them, noting that their limited content 
and enforceability hampers the likelihood of significant progress. Moreover, as our analysis of 
the resolutions shows, the U.N. continues to heavily emphasize accountability for sexual 
violence, sometimes to the exclusion of other concerns that are perhaps more intimately 
related to women’s real conception of “security” priorities. 
A. Relevant U.N. Resolutions 
In 2000, the U.N.’s Millennium Development Goals included a significant focus on 
women.33 During the same year, the Security Council adopted SCR 1325.34 Various 
rationales can be offered for the adoption of SCR 1325 at this moment, including: (1) the 
Security Council feeling that it needed to be seen as “doing something” (albeit via “soft” law) 
after the peacekeeping debacles in both Rwanda and Bosnia/Herzegovina; (2) the desire to be 
perceived as “doing something” specifically for women after the same two human rights crises 
revealed the rape and sexual violence of women being used as tools of war; and (3) a response 
to the concerted campaign by international women’s NGOs (who essentially embraced 
governance feminism in a political trade-off to gain U.N. Security Council access), who 
                                                                                                                               
 31. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1917, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1917 (Mar. 22, 2010). The resolution condemned, in 
particular, “forms of discrimination and violence against women and girls . . . aimed at preventing 
girls from attending schools,” under its agenda to focus on the promotion of women’s leadership and 
participation as part of peace-building processes. Id. ¶ 35. 
 32. 120,000 Girls Believed to Be Child Soldiers, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2005-04-25-voa27.html. 
 33. G.A. Res. 55/2, supra note 2. 
 34. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 1.  
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insisted the Security Council take a normative stand on women. While the contents of SCR 
1325 reflect the factors on which the permanent five member states of the Security Council 
could agree, adopting it also deflected attention from the things on which they could not 
agree. Tackling “women’s issues” by resolution allowed international actors adopting the 
resolution to maintain a comfortable and familiar role—that of males as protectors of 
women.35 
Over a period of ten years, the Security Council adopted five thematic resolutions on 
women, peace, and security. The stated goal was to “mainstream” women into all aspects of 
peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations.36 The adoption of SCRs was 
notable for several reasons. First, it formally acknowledged and addressed, at least 
rhetorically, the need to incorporate women into processes intended to secure peace. Second, 
because the U.N. Security Council is recognized and understood as the key global actor in the 
security arena, an actor whose resolutions are both determinative and binding as legal, 
political, and normative pronouncements, it was a powerful signal to the world that this was 
a message to be taken seriously. 
The first of these, SCR 1325, intended to “mainstream” gender by encouraging member 
states and U.N. bodies to fund gender-sensitive technical development and training, consider 
the different ways that conflict impacts women and girls, and strive to involve women in 
peace negotiations, policing, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.37 The resolution 
emphasized the importance of involving women and girls in post-conflict peace processes and 
“the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations.”38 The 
implementation of SCR 1325 has also involved U.N. member states (to varying uptake and 
degree) as they develop National Action Plans and other planning tools as a means to 
advance implementation of the resolution.39 
In the years following SCR 1325’s adoption, the Security Council continued its focus on 
women, attempting to fill gaps, add implementation and enforcement measures and be more 
specific with regard to what actions member states and international actors should undertake 
to mainstream women into their peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction activities. 
Under its women, peace and security agenda, the Security Council passed SCR 1820 in 2008, 
acknowledging and seeking to respond to sexual violence as a weapon of war, and adding to 
its corpus of activity around gender in conflict and post-conflict settings.40 Here it affirmed 
                                                                                                                               
 35. See also Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International Law over 
the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 11 (2009) (discussing additional factors for the adoption of SCR 
1325 at this particular time). 
 36. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 1, at 2.  
 37. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 1. See also Gender, Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding, UNITED NATIONS 
ASS’N IN CANADA, http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/un-peacekeeping/fact-sheets/gender-
peacekeeping-peacebuilding/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2010); Annan Offers Concrete Proposals to 
Address Devastation Wrought by Conflict on Women, UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 21, 2002), 
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=5103&Cr=women&Cr1=peace. 
 38. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 1, at 2.  
 39. See infra Part III.  
 40. S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008). 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 189 (2012) 
198 
that rape should be treated as a war crime41 (albeit only after several countries questioned 
whether rape really was an appropriate topic for Security Council review).42 
In 2009, the U.N. Security Council passed SCRs 1888 and 1889, each building on SCRs 
1325 and 1820. SCR 1888 called for the appointment of a Special Representative on Sexual 
Violence and gender advisors (referred to as Women Protection Advisors or WPAs, even 
though “gender” and “women” are not the same) within peacekeeping missions.43 SCR 1889 
focused on the post-conflict terrain more generally, and called for indicators to measure the 
implementation of SCR 1325.44 In December of 2010, it adopted SCR 1960, which called for a 
monitoring and reporting framework to track sexual violence in conflict.45 The resolutions are 
binding on member states, and must be implemented by them and by any international 
actors they supply or support or fund in conflict and post-conflict operations. 
B. Assessing the Resolutions 
The ideal way to assess the impact of the resolutions would be to assess whether they had 
reached their own, self-imposed benchmarks of success (or failure) during international 
interventions. Unfortunately, the SCRs do not contain such indicators, and the few external 
measures that exist are not sufficiently comprehensive or consistent to prove useful for 
ascertaining real-world impact. Indeed, it is very difficult even to measure things like “end of 
conflict” and “success” of such interventions, let alone find empirical data benchmarking 
successes across interventions.46 Because such indicators are sparse and of little benefit, we 
first look to and analyze the relevant text of the resolutions themselves. In Section III, we 
then evaluate the implementation of the SCRs through actions taken by specific countries 
and U.N. agencies that are mandated to focus on women’s interests in conflict ending 
processes. 
First we turn to SCR 1325. While some first hailed it as demonstrating a definitive shift in 
status for women in the war and peace matrix, this initial assessment has been tempered 
based on analysis of its content and observation of its implementation.47 On the positive side, 
                                                                                                                               
 41. See id. ¶ 4.  
 42. See UN Classifies Rape a ‘War Tactic,’ BBC NEWS (June 20, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7464462.stm. 
 43. S.C. Res. 1888, ¶¶ 4, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009) (reissued for technical reasons on 
June 22, 2010).  
 44. S.C. Res. 1889, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009).  
 45. S.C. Res. 1960, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960 (Dec. 16, 2010) (mandating, among other things, that the 
names of those “credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other 
forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict” in which the U.N. is involved be included in 
annual reports on the implementation of framework to track sexual violence in conflict).  
 46. We have argued elsewhere that individual post-conflict efforts should be more effectively and 
comprehensively benchmarked within each reconstruction programming effort undertaken with 
international assistance. See generally ON THE FRONTLINES, supra note 7. Such an undertaking is 
obviously beyond the scope of our critique with regard to responses to SCR 1325 in this Article. Even 
the U.N. Women’s Progress Report, while providing some valuable and comprehensive data on the 
overall status of women, only manages to survey some aspects of women’s status in certain countries 
in assessing women post-conflict. See generally UN WOMEN’S 2011–2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra 
note 6.  
 47. See generally Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with International Law 
through the UN Security Council, 32 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 97 (2010) (articulating a strong concern 
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SCR 1325 can be lauded for bringing women into the “peace and security” dimensions of 
international lawmaking. Security Council resolutions are not to be scoffed at, emerging from 
the highest pinnacle of the international lawmaking apex, and can communicate an evident 
normative weight. And some initial skepticism has been replaced by greater feminist 
confidence that recent resolutions have “managed to build on the footholds created by the 
earlier resolutions and slowly strengthen the feminist content of this institutional agenda.”48 
But, as discussed in this Article, caution is still warranted. There are many holes remaining 
in the content of the SCRs if the goal is to increase security by incorporating women into 
conflict and post-conflict processes. 
Textually, SCR 1325 makes only oblique reference to what it articulates makes women 
secure, focusing instead on a somewhat narrow view of security. For example, the Preamble 
makes reference to certain types of physical security, e.g., ensuring that demining programs 
consider the “special needs” of women and girls.49 The document as a whole does little to 
specifically articulate what must be done during situations of armed conflict to secure 
women’s safety in the short term, let alone more broadly address women’s centrality in the 
longer term, in order to achieve the goal of securing international peace. 
A general but primary problem with SCR 1325 and its progeny is that they focus too 
narrowly (and obliquely) on physical, and specifically sexual, security50 when, as we 
articulate further below, other concerns may have higher priority for women and be more 
tightly linked to achieving women’s real security across jurisdictions and cultural contexts. 
Yet, throughout the progression of these resolutions over time, the Security Council has 
continued with this focus.51 From the recent passage of another SCR devoted to sexual 
violence, we can deduce both that the Security Council persists in prioritizing sexual violence 
during conflict as its main gender goal and that it acknowledges that its goal, to appropriately 
respond to sexual violence, has not yet been achieved despite passage of the four preceding 
resolutions over the course of a decade. 
Having invested attention, labor, and money in addressing gender-based sexual 
violence52—a considerable amount at least in relation to its other attempts to focus on 
women—it is natural that the U.N. would wish to see some success achieved from prioritizing 
                                                                                                                               
about a victim/savior sub-text for the resolution, putting international masculinities in the 
comfortable role of “protecting” mainly female victims); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, International Law, 
Gender Regime and Fragmentation: 1325 and Beyond, in WOMEN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(forthcoming 2012).  
 48. Otto, supra note 47, at 99. 
 49. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 1, at 2. See also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 13–14 (relating to demobilization of soldiers 
and making reference to the “special needs” of girls and women during humanitarian missions 
without specifying what they might be).  
 50. In the post-conflict context, the U.N. has generally prioritized accountability for gender-based 
violence when turning to “women’s needs” in the post-conflict context. See, e.g., UN WOMEN’S 2011–
2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 6, at 82. 
 51. S.C. Res. 1960, supra note 45. 
 52. Examples include the establishment of a legal aid network in Sudan, made up of sixty-one Darfuri 
lawyers, one-third of whose cases were related to gender-based violence and local courts established 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to address the pervasive rape of women by tackling a 
small number of rape cases, characterized as “a small but nevertheless significant strike against 
impunity.” UN WOMEN’S 2011–2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 6, at 92–93. 
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those issues over the years. Yet, the too narrow focus misses the mark in several respects. 
First, it fails to accurately capture or respond to women’s articulated security priorities in the 
post-conflict setting.53 Second, even in taking aim at the narrow goal of addressing sexual 
violence, it still fails to effectively achieve accountability for those victims.54 While taking aim 
at achieving accountability for sexual violence is a laudable goal, the question is whether, 
particularly given the unlikelihood of success even within this narrow framework,55 an 
expanding international effort to broadly address women’s security needs might achieve 
more. 
SCR 1889 is the most unique and perhaps the most promising of the resolutions aimed at 
women. First, its scope is broader than the predecessor resolutions, which are focused on 
ensuring physical security and responding to sexual violence; and, second, it extends the 
emphasis on women to all post-conflict phases and processes. But, most importantly, it 
emphasizes practical matters—the funding and execution of those programs and policies. 
Relevant portions of SCR 1889 read as follows: 
 Noting that despite progress, obstacles to strengthening women’s participation in 
conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding remain, expressing concern 
that women’s capacity to engage in public decision making and economic recovery often 
does not receive adequate recognition or financing in post-conflict situations, and 
underlining that funding for women’s early recovery needs is vital to increase women’s 
empowerment, which can contribute to effective post-conflict peacebuilding.56 
Recognition of the need for funding programs focused on women, even in the early days of 
peacebuilding, is vital, in that during this “emergency period,” women’s concerns are often 
overlooked. The Security Council goes on to state in the first paragraph of 1889 that it 
 Urges Member States, international and regional organizations to take further 
measures to improve women’s participation during all stages of peace processes, 
particularly in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding, including 
by enhancing their engagement in political and economic decision-making at early 
stages of recovery processes, through inter alia promoting women’s leadership and 
capacity to engage in aid management and planning, supporting women’s 
organizations, and countering negative societal attitudes about women’s capacity to 
participate equally.57 
Here it specifically broadens the scope of gender mainstreaming to post-conflict 
reconstruction and also acknowledges the need to extend the concepts of security to include 
                                                                                                                               
 53. These are often context-specific, but as discussed below, in Part III, they often prioritize basic needs 
first, such as food security, and then issues that impact their families and children, such as 
employment, education, and so forth. 
 54. In offering this critique, we are mindful of the fact that the Security Council cannot deliver 
accountability per se, but is dependent on national and international courts.  
 55. The number of prosecutions is admittedly low. UN Women characterizes the DRC attempts as 
“small but nevertheless significant.” UN WOMEN’S 2011–2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 6, at 
93. Even with a focus on physical security, the U.N.’s conception is too narrow. For example, women 
will not talk to investigators if it is not safe to do so because even within this narrow conception of 
“security,” multiple concepts are embedded: safety to meet daily food and water needs, safety to 
travel, safety to tell without retaliation, safety to rely on the legal institutional structures and law 
enforcement after testifying, and so forth.  
 56. S.C. Res. 1889, supra note 44, at 2. 
 57. Id. ¶ 1. 
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“societal notions” about women’s capacity to participate. It sets out specific data, needs 
assessment and reporting requirements,58 and again “[u]rges . . . that women’s empowerment 
is taken into account during post-conflict needs assessments and planning, and factored into 
subsequent funding disbursements and programme activities, including through developing 
transparent analysis and tracking of funds allocated for addressing women’s needs in the 
post-conflict phase.”59 Finally, it expressly stresses the importance of ensuring to girls and 
women equal access to education, directly linking women’s education to the ability of women 
to actually be full participants in the post-conflict decision-making process,60 and requires the 
Secretary General to submit “a set of indicators for use at the global level to track 
implementation of its resolution 1325 (2000),” and on progress made in field missions.61 
SCRs 1888 and 1889 are both too new for a full assessment of their impact. Nonetheless, 
SCR 1889 explicitly expands the focus on women’s place (or lack of place) into the post-conflict 
context and perhaps most crucially, takes aim at strengthening women’s roles in peace 
negotiations, governance, and the financing of post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. This 
financing component is crucial because it formally extends the Security Council’s 
commitment to women, not only to U.N. agencies and the domestic governments that 
formally receive them, but to all international organizations contributing funds to or receiving 
funds for post-conflict reconstruction activities. Consequently, international organizations 
operating in the field view SCR 1889 as a “mandate” to conduct a “thorough analysis of gaps 
in frontline services [for women] and response capacity [to women’s post-conflict needs]” when 
creating post-conflict programs.62 
The Security Council, in U.N.-speak, has determined to “remain actively seized of the 
matter” of including and considering women’s needs and rights in the context of establishing 
peace and security.63 Although the sweep is grand and sometimes oblique, in passing these 
five resolutions and adopting its broad agenda focused on women, peace, and security, the 
U.N. Security Council acknowledges that the creation and protection of women’s rights and 
security is interrelated to the security and protection of all women, men, and children. Now 
that the U.N. has formally recognized this connection, what remains to be seen is whether the 
resolutions impact the behavior of international organizations and domestic actors in the field 
in a way that fundamentally improves women’s place in the conflict to post-conflict 
continuum. 
                                                                                                                               
 58. Id. ¶ 6. 
 59. Id. ¶ 9. 
 60. Id. ¶ 11. 
 61. Id. ¶ 17. 
 62. CARE INT’L, FROM RESOLUTION TO REALITY: LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN, NEPAL AND 
UGANDA ON WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACEBUILDING AND POST-CONFLICT GOVERNANCE 2 
(2011), available at http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/UNSCR-1325/CARE-1325-Report-
Women-Peace-Participation.pdf. 
 63. S.C. Res. 1889, supra note 44, ¶ 20. 
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III. Compliance with the U.N. Resolutions 
Since the Security Council passed SCR 1325, all U.N. agencies and some member states, 
international organizations and donor organizations operating in concert with international 
missions have made some efforts to comply. In some countries, as discussed next, this takes 
form in national action plans which attempt to recalibrate the work of their organizations, 
militaries, foreign ministries, and development organizations involved in peacebuilding, 
peacekeeping, and post-conflict processes. Other countries have been the object of country-
specific resolutions passed by the U.N. aimed at identifying and resolving issues within those 
countries’ conflict and post-conflict settings. The following Section evaluates how countries 
have responded to these particularized resolutions. Notwithstanding all of these efforts, much 
remains missing in truly effecting change for women, as Sections III and IV demonstrate. 
A. National Action Plans: Do They Effectively Demonstrate 
Compliance? 
National Action Plans (NAPs) were created in direct response to Presidential Statements 
issued by the Security Council which called on member states to identify strategic actions, 
priorities and resources and determine the division of responsibility and timeframes for the 
implementation of SCR 1325, and explicitly urged the development of NAPs.64 
Of the countries that have prepared NAPs, only thirty-seven, as of this writing, have 
prepared NAPS. All have organized the goals, indicators, impediments, and implementation 
plans, roughly by the following data points: 
• Country 
• Primary Focus of Plan 
• Measures Proposed to Achieve Goals 
• Indicators of Success 
• Acknowledgement of Areas of Continued Need 
• Specific/Novel/Notable Plans for Implementation65 
So, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina identified “increasing participation of women in 
decision-making position[s] at all levels of government” as a primary focus, and among the 
measures they have identified to achieve it are implementing gender laws and increasing 
media spots for women.66 Impediments to achieving that goal included the need to “sensitize 
the new private sector heads about gender parity requirements.”67 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
specific plans included increasing the number of women in the armed forces. 
                                                                                                                               
 64. See Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/40 (Oct. 28, 2004); 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/52 (Oct. 27, 2005). 
 65. All National Action Plans can be viewed online. National Action Plans, PEACEWOMEN.ORG, 
http://peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/national-action-plans-naps (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
The U.S. plan was adopted in December, 2011. Id.  
 66. GEND. EQUAL. AGENCY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVNIA, MINISTRY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEES 
OF BIH, ACTION PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 1325 IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
2010–2013, 23 (2010), available at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/bosniaherzegovina_nationalactionplan_2010.pdf. 
 67. Id. at 6. 
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As a means of evaluating the success of SCR 1325, NAPs are quite limited. First, relatively 
few nations have created NAPs, and those nations have been inconsistent in approach and 
content. Although they may share some similarities in the structure of their documentation, 
most paralleling the request as set forth in the Security Council Presidential Statements, the 
goals, actions, means of implementation, and metrics for measuring success vary significantly 
from country to country. Second, some states that have drafted NAPs are best considered 
“donor states” (those sending aid or peacekeepers or contributing civil servants to U.N. 
missions), while others are best considered “recipient states” (those receiving such aid or 
intervention); consequently, the NAPs are drafted for a variety of purposes and reflect 
different state subjectivities. Nonetheless, they are useful documents in showing the range of 
possible actions that countries in conflict or those supporting them might take. 
The following sampling looks at four substantive categories addressed by six countries 
that have produced NAPs (the United States, France, Austria, Belgium, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone). Not every element can be assessed through such a limited sampling, but it does 
reveal how different countries interpret what SCR 1325 requires, what they believe it 
mandates of them, and how they respond to their obligations. The comparative data points in 
this sampling include: (1) increasing the number of women in the police, military, judiciary 
and elected offices; (2) educating women and girls; (3) increasing women’s employability and 
job opportunities; and (4) perfecting laws that disadvantage women or drafting and 
implementing laws to promote women’s equality. The four categories were selected as 
relatively common post-conflict initiatives identified to “improve opportunities for women.”68 
Even though these are four relatively well-accepted methods of successfully incorporating 
women, they are neither universally perceived as necessary, nor universally addressed, as 
evidenced below. The sampling revealed the following: 
 
1. Increasing the Number of Women Police, Military, Judiciary and Elected Officials 
Austria: Increase the representation of Austrian women in foreign peace operations of 
the police force, Federal Armed Forces, judiciary, administration of justice and among 
prison officers.69 
Belgium: (1) Advocate for the participation of women’s groups in peace negotiations, 
(including reserving funds for training women and women’s groups in order to 
effectively involve them in post-conflict processes such as through determining the order 
of local zones to be demined); and (2) involve more women in both civil and military 
peace missions at all levels.70 
                                                                                                                               
 68. Similar entries have been eliminated to avoid duplication. 
 69. FED. MINISTRY FOR EUROPEAN AND INT’L AFFAIRS, AUSTRIAN ACTION PLAN ON IMPLEMENTING UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325 (2000) 4 (2007) [hereinafter AUSTRIAN NAP], available at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/austria_nationalactionplan_august200
7.pdf. 
 70. WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: BELGIAN NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325, 14, 18 (Dirk Achten ed., 2009) [hereinafter BELGIAN NAP], 
available at http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/belgium_nap_2009.pdf. 
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France: Support the nomination and appointment by the U.N. Secretary-General of 
women as representatives and special envoys in charge of missions, and as human 
rights specialists employed in the field.71 
Rwanda: Increase women’s involvement in the army and police by reviewing and 
improving recruitment procedures and by providing training for women leaders in 
conflict management, mediation and peace negotiation techniques. Planned activities 
include training soldiers and police officers in international humanitarian law.72 
Sierra Leone: (1) Train women at community level to engage their parliamentarians 
and councillors on the desired minimum thirty percent quota representation for women, 
in order to increase women’s representation and gender parity in decisionmaking at all 
levels of government; and (2) improve the recruitment and retention of women in law 
enforcement, justice and security institutions.73 
 
2. Educating Women/Girls 
Rwanda: (1) Address particular needs of women post-conflict, e.g., reintegration of 
former women combatants, special services for women refugees and displaced women, 
and establishing an infrastructure for women living with disability; and (2) promote 
community dialogue aimed at improving community and marital relationships and 
training and discussion on peaceful cohabitation.74 
Sierra Leone: (1) Train women in peace mediation, negotiation, gender mainstreaming 
in peace consolidation/recovery, and security; and (2) recommend them to serve at 
national, regional, and international levels and enhance retention.75 
 
3. Job Training/Job Creation for Women 
Austria: [Identifies specific projects funded and supported by Austria, such as the] 
Traumatised Children project in Burundi (providing education) and the Women’s 
Empowerment project in Uganda (providing vocational skills training to child soldiers, 
wives of rebels, and women and children in general).76 
                                                                                                                               
 71. NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR FRANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE “WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY” 
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 7 (2010) [hereinafter NAP FOR FRANCE], 
available at http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/france_nationalaction 
 plan_2010.pdf. 
 72. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN 2009–2012: THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325/2000 ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 13–15 (2010) [hereinafter 
RWANDA NAP], available at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/rwandan_national_action_plan_13
25.pdf. 
 73. THE SIERRA LEONE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1325 (2000) & 1820 (2008) 39 (2010) [hereinafter SIERRA LEONE 
NAP], available at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/sierra_leone_nap.pdf. 
 74. RWANDA NAP, supra note 72, at 16–19. 
 75. SIERRA LEONE NAP, supra note 73, at 22, 39. 
 76. AUSTRIAN NAP, supra note 69, at 16 (including specific budget estimates). 
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Rwanda: Promote effective collaboration between men and women, organize trainings 
for women leaders, and conduct grassroots trainings on the existence of financial 
opportunities for women and in “gender budgeting.”77 
United States: (1) Promote women’s roles in conflict prevention, improve conflict early-
warning and response systems through the integration of gender perspectives, and 
invest in women’s and girls’ health, education, and economic opportunities to create 
conditions for stable societies and lasting peace; (2) actively engage women in planning 
and implementing disaster and emergency preparedness and risk reduction activities; 
and (3) provide diplomatic and developmental support to advance women’s economic 
development (e.g., cash for work programs and increased access to land and credit).78 
 
4. Adapting Laws to Enhance Protections for Women (Sampling Attempts to Identify 
Plans Not Focused on Responding to Sexual Violence, which are more rare) 
Austria: [Identifies Austrian funded and promoted] Projects in Sri Lanka, Uganda, 
Burundi, and Nepal encouraging women to “claim their rights,” including budgetary 
support for justice, law and order sector, with thematic focus on business, commercial, 
and criminal law, land law, and family law (including security of person and property, 
promotion of economic development, and improvement of the living conditions of 
population groups threatened by poverty); Paralegal Training and Advocacy Program in 
Uganda, to offer legal advisory services, counseling for domestic violence, and respond to 
human rights crises with sensitivity to local law and culture.79 
France: Include women’s rights and gender equality norms in all bilateral and regional 
dialogues on security issues, particularly with the African Union and the other regional 
organizations.80 
Rwanda: (1) Translate and disseminate international and regional conventions and 
national laws relating to women’s rights and peace building (specific budget included); 
(2) promote ratification of regional and international laws relating to women’s rights, 
and gender equity; and (3) sensitize local authorities to women’s rights and issues.81 
Sierra Leone: Implement and ratify various instruments (CEDAW, African Union 
Women’s protocol, ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework) to ensure that 
constitutional reforms include gender parity principles and remove all forms of 
discrimination against women and girls, and translate all relevant instruments into 
local languages to be disseminated at the local level.82 
United States: Promote rule of law, policies, and practices that strengthen gender 
equality at national and local levels.83 
                                                                                                                               
 77. RWANDA NAP, supra note 72, at 20–21, 26 (including specific budget and plans for donor 
conferences). 
 78. UNITED STATES NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY 12, 20, 21 (2011) 
[hereinafter U.S. NAP]. 
 79. AUSTRIAN NAP, supra note 69, at 16–24 (including a specific budget). 
 80. NAP FOR FRANCE, supra note 71, at 14 (focusing primarily on sexual violence). 
 81. RWANDA NAP, supra note 72, at 13–14, 23. 
 82. SIERRA LEONE NAP, supra note 73, at 24, 38. 
 83. U.S. NAP, supra note 78, at 4 (focusing primarily on responding to sexual violence). 
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The targets and objectives set forward in the NAPs are sometimes specific in identifying 
anticipated budgets (e.g., Rwanda) and sources of funds (e.g., Austria and Belgium), while 
others (e.g., France) are more vague. They are often creative, but sometimes rote. Donor 
countries most often aim their plans at the countries they assist rather than at themselves, 
while the recipient countries seem concerned with proving themselves to donors—focusing on 
listing what they have done and what they plan to do that will bring them into compliance 
with regional or U.N. requirements, so as not to lose funding and assistance. 
On the one hand, the NAPs seem hollow. In addition to being too uneven to serve as 
assessment tools, they contain no legal enforcement provisions, nor are any required by SCR 
1325 or the subsequent Presidential Statements, and only a few countries have been 
updating their NAPs.84 On the other hand, the NAPs may serve as norm-setting mechanisms, 
setting forth the assessments by individual countries as to what changes are necessary to 
yield more respect for women. They may also serve a sort of “donor clearing house” function, 
allowing donor countries to direct or recipient countries to solicit funding for projects on the 
ground. Occasionally, NAPs also make remarkably astute observations about the underlying 
structural problems experienced by women in specific countries, thereby providing a basis for 
post-conflict programs which could tackle structural problems while aiding with the post-
conflict transitional process.85 Because of the unevenness and few updates, it is difficult for 
external observers to assess whether or precisely how NAPs have contributed to specific 
improvements for women in the field beyond the important factor that within each country 
someone thought about how to better incorporate women, what would be indicators of 
success, and whether there were impediments to achieving those goals and how these plans 
would be implemented. 
B. Country-Specific Resolutions 
The U.N. adopts country-specific resolutions designed to set priorities for the “host” 
governments, U.N. agencies, and international actors partnering with U.N. agencies 
operating within the conflict or post-conflict environment. Because the Security Council has 
prioritized women in the context of peace and conflict operations, these country-specific 
resolutions inevitably make reference to the language and goals contained in SCR 1325 and 
its progeny when articulating those priorities. In this Section, we look at some of these 
country-specific resolutions to assess whether the fact that they reference the SCRs 
effectively alters the conflict or post-conflict terrain favorably for women. At the outset, we 
must note that here too there is a dearth of comprehensive data, although U.N. PeaceWomen 
has provided relevant ad hoc information.86 In reviewing some of the country-specific 
resolutions, a few key themes emerge. 
                                                                                                                               
84. According to the repository maintained by PeaceWomen, only Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland 
and Sweden have updated or revised their plans. See National Action Plans, supra note 65. 
 85. See, e.g., RWANDA NAP, supra note 72, at 7 (indicating “feminization of poverty” as an impediment 
to full realization of the goals of SCR 1325).  
 86. WOMEN’S INT’L LEAGUE FOR PEACE & FREEDOM (WILPF) (A PEACEWOMEN PROJECT), WOMEN, 
PEACE AND SECURITY HANDBOOK: COMPILATION AND ANALYSIS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
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First, many country-specific resolutions prioritize women’s political rights. In so doing, 
they support the notion that sometimes women’s perspectives are best included and 
emphasized from the ground up, within civil society groups, for example, rather than from the 
top down, as members of negotiation teams, electoral processes, and central legal and political 
institutions. For example, resolutions adopted for peace processes in Cote d’Ivoire87 and 
Haiti88 each identify the importance of including women in the development of the electoral 
process. Resolutions adopted for Afghanistan89 and Darfur90 respectively encourage the 
participation of women in governance reform at the national and local levels and “underline” 
the need for the engagement of women in civil society.91 So one theme evident and 
emphasized within all four of the country-specific resolutions mentioned here, all passed 
immediately after and likely responsive to concerns articulated in SCR 1889, is how best to 
bring women into “governance,” when reconfiguring governance structures and processes 
after conflicts. While some include women in the development of electoral processes during 
the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction, these four country-specific resolutions appear 
only to “bring women in” after the fact by teaching them how to be involved in elections and 
electoral processes and by encouraging women’s participation in civil society (NGOs), in lieu 
of directly in central government itself.92 None of the four country-specific agreements 
mentioned here requires the participation of women in the formal peace process or during the 
multiple rounds of developing post-conflict programs. As we have argued elsewhere,93 
creating post-conflict mechanisms and processes for inserting women into formal power 
structures (as well as informal ones) may be important both to women’s security and to 
overall post-conflict stability within a country.94 Although we do not endorse the insertion of 
                                                                                                                               
COUNCIL RESOLUTION LANGUAGE 2000–2010 (2010), available at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/peacewomen_schandbook_2010.pdf. 
 87. See S.C. Res. 1933, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1933 (June 30, 2010). The U.N. has been present in Cote 
d’Ivoire since 2004 with the U.N. Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI). This is considered a 
peacekeeping mission. UNOCI Background, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/background.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 88. See S.C. Res. 1927, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1927 (June 4, 2010). The U.N. has been present in Haiti since 
2004 with MINUSTAH, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti, a peacekeeping mission. 
MINUSTAH Background, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 
2012). 
 89. The U.N. has been present in Afghanistan since 2002, in the form of the U.N. Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan. The focus of its mission is political. Mandate, UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN 
AFGHANISTAN, http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12255&language=en-US (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 90. The U.N. has been present in Darfur and Chad since 2007, with the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and 
Chad (MINURCAT). U.N. Doc. S/RES/1881 (July 30, 2009). These are considered peacekeeping 
missions. 
 91. See S.C. Res. 1917, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1917 (Mar. 22, 2010) (Afghanistan); S.C. Res. 1881, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1881 (July 30, 2009) (Darfur). 
 92. For more on whether women gain more through direct involvement in government structures or 
through civil society, see ON THE FRONTLINES, supra note 7, chs. 9, 10. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Gizelis, supra note 16, at 538 (articulating specific examples in Sierra Leone and Liberia where 
“international organizations . . . failed to engage women in the post-reconstruction process, 
undermining well meaning programs and projects”).  
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women into government positions (central, regional or local) in the absence of other measures 
promoting women’s political, social, and economic capital, we do see the value of promoting 
women’s presence in governance until it reaches a critical tipping point where input may 
make its way into policy and law. 
Second, by and large, where referring to women, country-specific resolutions passed for 
ongoing operations in the field still tend to prioritize responding to sexual violence and 
encouraging actions that place women into political structures and processes (political rights). 
The emphasis remains on keeping women physically “safe” and on securing their place within 
the formal (albeit often nascent) political sphere, rather than on making women truly “secure” 
and centralized in the broader and longer term sense. 
The recommendations made “for women” in the country-specific resolutions are neither 
novel nor proven to actually impact women favorably; indeed, they are actually quite minor 
and non-controversial. This suggests that the U.N. agencies operating in the field either lack 
confidence in their ability to articulate what programs and initiatives will actually favorably 
impact women, or they are “paying lip service” to their obligation to implement the SCRs. It is 
also possible that a problem we have elsewhere identified is occurring here: when 
international actors operate in the “heat” of the post-conflict environment, in what we refer to 
as “emergency mode,”95 women’s issues are not sufficiently prioritized and identified. 
Following are two country-specific examples. They are limited, aiming neither to cover all 
of the issues in a particular country, nor all of the issues facing women in conflict-related 
settings. Their purpose, instead, is to provide examples of problems that continue to plague 
women in conflict and post-conflict settings, despite passage of the SCRs. As the following 
examples show, even with the Security Council attempt to direct the focus of actors operating 
in the field onto securing women’s safety and mainstreaming them into conflict response 
processes, errors are still being made, women are still going unprotected or unconsidered, and 
results are still far too uneven. 
1. International Interactions with Darfuri Refugees96 
Millions of Darfuri women remained displaced within Darfur and in Chad after their 
initial flight.97 In response, the Security Council passed country specific SCR 1881 on Darfur 
in 2009 which invoked strong language to demand, among other things, that the parties to 
the conflict “immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women 
                                                                                                                               
 95. See ON THE FRONTLINES, supra note 7, ch. 4. 
 96. The methodology of the interviews, conducted in Arabic and Maalit, was as follows: “The field 
investigation consisted of a questionnaire with 42 questions about the respondent’s life in Darfur, 
the events that caused her to leave Darfur, her life in Chad and her self-reported health status.” 
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NOWHERE TO TURN: FAILURE TO PROTECT, SUPPORT AND ASSURE 
JUSTICE FOR DARFURI WOMEN 2 (2009) [hereinafter NOWHERE TO TURN]. “The average age of 
interviewees was 35 years with a median age of 30 years and an age range of 18 to 75 years. Almost 
half (43%) of the interviewees did not have a husband living with them in the camp.” Id. at 3. 
 97. After reaching almost three million in 2009, recent estimates of displaced Darfuris put the number 
at approximately two million. Darfur Refugees Still Fear Returning Home, TURKISH WEEKLY (Mar. 
24, 2012), http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/132908/darfur-refugees-still-fear-returning-
home.html.  
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and children, from all forms of sexual violence, in line with resolution [“women-focused” 
SCR]1820.”98 
During their flight and since their displacement, many Darfuri women were subjected to 
violent rape and sexual assault, not only by their aggressors during the conflict, but also by 
both Chadians and Sudanese making incursions across the border.99 Many of these assaults 
were recorded between 2004–2006, long after passage of SCR 1325, but before passage of SCR 
1820, and occurred when women and girls left camp to secure wood and water. As a 
consequence, by 2007 some international humanitarian aid had begun to focus on providing 
materials, such as wood and water, so that women would not have to leave camp and become 
vulnerable to attack.100 Nonetheless, by 2008 only minimal materials were still supplied and 
women were again leaving camp to secure wood.101 
Some of the women, who had reported sexual violence and were again consulted as part of 
a follow up interview three years later,102 articulated that although they felt profoundly 
stigmatized by the sexual violence, many of their current goals and priorities had nothing to 
do with responding to the sexual violence, the focus of the U.N.’s country-specific resolution. 
Rather, they prioritized “return to their villages, to regain their livelihoods and the daily 
routines that gave their lives dignity and purpose.”103 A strong majority of those interviewed, 
nearly 60%, reported that their immediate concern was insufficient food.104 “Many said they 
were always hungry; that the diet and quantities of food were inadequate and that rations 
were continuing to be cut.”105 In fact, the Physicians for Human Rights Report concluded 
with the following assessment: 
[A]fter five years, the Darfuris living in the camps [in Chad] are reaching a “tipping 
point” of physical misery, depression, and dissatisfaction in the camps. This is due to a 
variety of reasons, including the lack of physical security outside the camps, insufficient 
food rations, a yearning to return home and a lack of opportunities for adults to earn 
money.106 
This case study demonstrates many things: that while sexual violence gets the initial 
attention of the public, we are still unclear about how to respond to it; that donor and public 
interest drifts away even while problems remain; and that we still do not really know what 
women want and need, even if we are willing to attempt to supply it. In this study, the 
women indicated their basic needs—food, the ability to return home, and the means to earn a 
livelihood.107 Why then are these articulated needs not made the primary focus of 
                                                                                                                               
 98. S.C. Res. 1881, supra note 91, ¶ 14. 
 99. NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 96, at 3. 
 100. Id. at 2. 
 101. Id. 
 102. The previous report was conducted by Physicians for Human Rights. NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 
96, at 9 (describing Physicians for Human Rights activities in response to the Darfur crisis leading 
up to the 2009 report). 
 103. Id. at iii. 
 104. Id. at 5. 
 105. Id. (“Food rations consisted of 2,100 calories in the form of sorghum, oil, salt, sugar and a corn-soy 
blend. . . . Refugees had to pay or give a portion of their ration to have the sorghum ground, and 
many sold their sorghum rations for milk or meat, thereby diminishing their total caloric intake.”).  
 106. Id. at 6. 
 107. Darfuri refugees in Chad are not alone in identifying such needs. UN Women reports that: 
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international organizations supplying post-conflict humanitarian services? Is it because these 
basic needs are not “sexy” enough to secure support from donors who would prefer, for 
example, to respond to sexual violence, rather than to increase food rations or create micro-
enterprise opportunities? Is it more pragmatic—that there is such considerable lag time 
between the occurrence of a crisis (in this case, rape of refugee women gathering firewood), 
the identification of the crisis by external organizations, the conveyance of the existence of the 
crisis to the public and donor groups, the ability of donor organizations to secure funds and 
send back a response team, for the response team to assess needs, and for donors to then 
respond to those assessed needs not for a short period of time, but until the problem is 
resolved? Certainly, donor organizations and member states responding to humanitarian 
crises are overstretched. The scale of the challenge of responding to such crises is extreme 
and there is the ever-present reality of financial limitation to acknowledge. Yet, time and 
again we see what is referred to as “donor fatigue”—assessments and donations focused on 
problems that, even if still not resolved, have become less of a priority than newer, “sexier,” or 
more immediate problems. More importantly, it illustrates the way in which the international 
community perpetually defaults to a masculine way of thinking in which thinking about 
women (when it happens at all) leads first, and reflexively, to patriarchal protection schemes 
(such as ending sexual violence), but seems unwilling to address the very masculinities and 
structures that produce that systematic sexual violence. 
The relentless focus on sexual violence raises the following important issue—what 
questions are women being asked if and when they are consulted about what they need to feel 
safe? Narrow questions like “which crimes would you like us to focus on when we hold 
perpetrators accountable?” are not only loaded and leading questions, but likely to yield 
different responses than would questions like “what will it take for you to feel secure in the 
post-conflict environment?” Even when women reply, for example, that their immediate 
priorities are “food insecurity,” or returning home, the responses may fall on deaf ears if 
donors funding the assessment want to focus on the lingering impacts of sexual violence.108 
It also demonstrates the fact that while the U.N.’s will to shift attention to women is 
improving, in many respects the effects have not yet consistently trickled down to the women 
                                                                                                                               
In Cambodia, for example, 83 percent of women and men prioritized jobs, while 37 percent 
said that the delivery of services including health care and food was most important. In 
Timor-Leste, half of the women surveyed identified education for their children as their top 
priority. In the Central African Republic, women said they needed money, access to services 
and housing. 
 UN WOMEN’S 2011–2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 6, at 84 (citations omitted). 
 108. See, e.g., NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 96. The goal of this report was  
to conduct a systematic assessment of sexual assault and other human rights violations 
suffered by Darfuri women who had been subjected to sexual violence in the course of 
attacks on their villages in Darfur and forced flight to camps on the Chad/Sudan border. The 
effort was part of a continued commitment to assuring that crimes against humanity, 
including sexual assault, be documented and exposed, and their mental, physical and social 
consequences understood so that increased protection, prevention, healing and 
comprehensive justice can be delivered to the survivors.  
 Id. at 1.  
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whose lives are at stake.109 Nine years after SCR 1325, Darfuri women in refugee camps in 
Chad claimed excessively high rates of depression, sexual violence as a consequence of their 
refugee status, and food insecurity, just to name a few of the issues most crucial to them. 
Recalling that SCR 1881 for Darfur demanded that the parties to the conflict “immediately 
take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and children, from all forms 
of sexual violence, in line with resolution 1820,”110 revealing how both the gender-based 
security resolutions and the country-specific resolutions attempting to implement them are 
failing to achieve even the most basic safety for women. Certainly, the refugee host country of 
Chad may be differently bound, as a matter of international law, than the parties to the 
conflict (operating in Sudan and Chad). But the most important potential of the Security 
Council resolutions is not their legal effect on parties to the conflict, but on the directives they 
provide to the international and local actors attempting to direct their assistance. Women 
want sufficient food, the ability to return home, and the means to support themselves 
financially in the meantime. SCR 1325, with its directive to mainstream women, is too vague 
to provide concrete direction to international actors. SCR 1820 may have brought attention to 
the sexual violence these women suffered, but failed to secure even the basic tools and 
supplies (wood and water) needed to avoid it.  
Together, all of the gender-focused SCRs could have an influence on international 
humanitarian actors and donors, in that they give capacity to these donors to re-prioritize, 
such that even when resources are few, women’s concerns are at the top of the agenda. The 
resolutions provided instructions to governments and international institutions to be more 
thoughtful about how they address gender. Their failure to do so illustrates the point that the 
gender dimensions of the SCRs may be window dressing. 
2. International Interactions with Women in Afghanistan in the Wake of 
the Security Council Resolutions 
Afghan women experienced sustained and entrenched exclusion, discrimination and 
violence when the Taliban gained primary political control over Afghanistan. Over the six 
years of Taliban rule, the status and harms experienced by Afghani women were largely 
ignored by the international community and were never viewed as a matter of such import as 
to justify international intervention on the basis of a threat to “international peace and 
security” under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Only after the catastrophic events of 9/11, 
when Osama bin Laden was determined to be hiding in Afghanistan, did key political states 
and international institutions begin discussing “the plight of women” in Afghanistan utilizing 
such articulation as part of the text of justifying broad military intervention. 
                                                                                                                               
 109. It should be noted that the country of Chad has a role to play here. As a refugee-receiving nation, it 
bears the obligation, under the international jus cogens norm of non-refoulement, not to return 
refugees who would be persecuted. Yet Chad, as one of the world’s poorest countries, is under-
resourced and relies, therefore, on U.N. and international agencies to supply the refugees with their 
basic needs. Practically speaking, it should be acknowledged that this situation is not a loss for 
Chad, which has seen tremendous economic growth with the presence of international organizations 
over the past decade. 
 110. S.C. Res. 1881, supra note 91, ¶ 14. 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 189 (2012) 
212 
In 2011, after almost a decade of international involvement in Afghanistan, a conference 
was held in Bonn, Germany to assess the progress made in Afghanistan and to plan its future 
following international withdrawal.111 Recall that improving women’s status over that which 
they endured under the Taliban was a vocal part of the public international agenda in 
Afghanistan. Despite this “central focus” on Afghan women, Afghani women’s NGOs were 
sidelined from that meeting in Bonn. Only after posting a statement on their website 
decrying the hypocrisy of the international community for failing to include them in these 
planning sessions, and with significant behind-the-scenes intervention, support, and lobbying 
from international women’s groups with access to political elites and media networks, were 
they ultimately included.112 The extent to which their inclusion resulted in any substantive 
structural change to the political and economic structures that produced inequality and 
violence for Afghani women remains debatable. But this example captures the tenuousness 
and complexity of the enforcement terrain in which SCR 1325 and the other resolutions 
function. Simply put, they lack enforcement capacity and will.  
This is also an example of how when complex matters such as negotiating the beginning or 
ending of post-conflict assistance are discussed, women and women’s issues are often ignored 
as not important enough to consider when “real” or “urgent” issues are on the table.113 The 
international actors purporting to care for the advancement of Afghan people utterly failed to 
consider the inclusion of women in its meeting about withdrawing the international presence 
from Afghanistan. This type of exclusion may be equally representative of a pre-negotiation 
compromise with conservative political groups for whom traditional roles for women are an 
integral part of their state building/consolidation vision. Thus, it is not only an example of 
ignoring women, but a trade-off made in the name of “security” that prioritizes the values of 
the intervening actors and their security needs over the real and prescient needs of women on 
the ground. 
A significant part of the international intervention in Afghanistan was focused on women, 
particularly supplying them with political and civil rights such as quotas for women in 
political institutions and support for the creation of civil society. As a consequence, Afghan 
women have indeed taken on more leadership roles, “as members of parliament, judges, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, police officers, soldiers, civil society officials, and human 
rights activists.”114 But whether those roles translate to real rights and power is 
                                                                                                                               
 111. Afghanistan: A Decade of Missed Opportunities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/03/afghanistan-decade-missed-opportunities [hereinafter HRW 
Afghanistan]. 
 112. The initial protest statement made by Women Living Under Muslim Laws (MLUML) was available 
at http://www.wluml.org/action/wluml-statement-afghan-womens-exclusion-participation-bonn, but 
has since been removed. See id. (reflecting on the post by stating “Afghan women leaders and 
activists had to lobby strenuously simply to obtain representation at the conference and a small slot 
to speak. Human Rights Watch called on Afghan government officials and other conference 
participants to work harder to improve women’s participation in decision-making about 
Afghanistan’s future, including any future peace processes.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Dina Francesca Haynes, Lessons from Bosnia’s Arizona Market: Harm to Women in a 
Neoliberalized Postconflict Reconstruction Process, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1779, 1803, 1810, 1816 (2010) 
(quoting then head of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bosnia with regard 
to women’s issues failing to be considered at virtually every stage of the peace building process).  
 114. HRW Afghanistan, supra note 111. See also, ON THE FRONTLINES, supra note 7, ch. 10. 
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questionable. For example, despite these gains via electoral quotas, ordinary Afghan women 
still lack even the most basic protections, rights and security: 
The Taliban and other armed groups [still] attack and threaten women, frequently 
focusing on women in public life, school girls, and the staff of girls’ schools. The 
government incarcerates women and girls for “moral crimes” such as running away 
from home—even when doing so is not prohibited by statutory law, with an estimated 
half of the approximately 700 women and girls in jail and prison facing such charges. 
Infant mortality and maternal mortality remain among the highest in the world, with 1 
in 10 children dying before age 5 and a woman dying of pregnancy-related causes 
approximately every two hours.115 
So, while the proliferation of rules and institutions that emanate from post-conflict 
reconstruction do represent a certain opportunity for concrete structural inclusion, 
oftentimes, the creation of the institutions alone is incorrectly viewed as sufficient to “meet 
women’s needs” by “mainstreaming” them into newly created formal structures. One can see 
that “the more the merrier” approach has driven the extraordinary amount of political and 
legal energy devoted to placing women into formal institutional settings. In Afghanistan in 
2010, for example, 350 women ran for the sixty-eight parliamentary seats that had been set-
aside for females.116 The institution of quotas for women in office can be interpreted in 
multiple ways. They can be viewed as a promising advance, signaling the increased 
importance that key international organizations and states have given to realities 
experienced by women in war. Or they can be viewed critically, as representing a part of a 
broader phenomenon in which the term “woman” can be brought into play (as a legal or 
political matter) without actually doing any substantive work for the subjects thus 
conjectured. Violence against women in Afghanistan remains pervasive; this is reflective of 
women’s real status in the country, despite numerical gains via quota in formal political 
institutions. Legal reforms, which may look good on paper, have failed to improve the lives of 
women, as they are not enforced,117 and cultural norms continue to control women’s status. 
The disparity of opinion on the “success” of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, too, 
is striking. While Human Rights Watch calls this a “[d]ecade of missed opportunities,”118 The 
Economist claims the decade of international involvement in post-conflict reconstruction has 
“greatly improved . . . the lot of women and girls.”119 Certainly women’s existence is improved 
over that which they experienced under Taliban rule. Yet, with a decade of direct 
international involvement, and a decade in which to become comfortable responding to SCR 
1325, more progress should have been made. It is unclear, therefore, not only whether women 
do better under the deals “for women” that result from attempts to comply with SCR 1325, 
                                                                                                                               
 115. HRW Afghanistan, supra note 111.  
 116. Women in Afghanistan Prepare to Take Office, WOMEN’S DEMOCRACY NETWORK (Dec. 2, 2010), 
http://www.wdn.org/news-events-press-center/events/women-afghanistan-prepare-take-office (“More 
than 350 women registered as candidates for the 68 seats allocated for women in Afghanistan’s 
parliamentary elections on September 18, 2010 . . . . [resulting in] 16 newly-elected women 
representing 13 provinces.”). 
 117. HRW Afghanistan, supra note 111 (discussing the 2009 Law on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women). 
 118. Id. 
 119. How to End It, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2011, at 18–19. 
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but also whether, from the perspective of women, SCR 1325 has indeed improved their lives 
in the ways in which they themselves would prioritize.120 When the rhetoric meets the 
culture, women’s lives may only marginally improve. Furthermore, when future political 
deals are made with regard to the departure of the international community, there exists the 
increasing danger of backslide, exemplified by “deals” between Pakistan and the Taliban to 
cede control of family and religious issues to religious courts.121 
But the most striking factor here is this: if all of the major donor states and organizations 
coming together to assess the future of reconstruction and transition efforts in Afghanistan, 
many of which have adopted NAPs as part of a desire to comply with SCR 1325 and its 
progeny, still fail to see the value in inviting those Afghani women to a meeting that will 
determine their future, then we have clearly not yet understood how to “mainstream” women, 
let alone achieve some of the more ambitious directives set forth in SCRs 1888 and 1889. 
In summing up these two country examples, some themes become clear. The SCRs and 
country resolutions attempting to employ them are only as good as the knowledge and will of 
local actors, international actors, donors, and member states to honor, enforce and implement 
them. When matters are deemed “urgent,” women’s concerns and participation still fall to the 
bottom of the list of priorities. Women are still not adequately consulted or utilized during 
needs assessments. Yet, it is not enough that they merely be interviewed or consulted. They 
must also be asked the right questions in every post-conflict context, at multiple stages, as 
priorities shift, if even the narrow U.N. goal of “consulting with local and national women’s 
groups”122 is to be achieved. 
Inclusion in the country-specific resolutions of language contained within the SCRs 
demonstrates some new and laudable attempts to remind both local and international actors 
in the field of their obligations to include women in their post-conflict projects. But when lined 
up next to the range of actual activities in the field, we see the execution of these same 
objectives falling flat, ignored, or sidelined in favor of more pressing concerns. For SCR 1325 
to be effective we should be able to see consistently positive results on the ground. It has, 
after all, been more than a decade since its passage. And yet, other than the regularization, in 
some instances, of mechanical processes (e.g., the institution of election education programs 
for women), and the broader acceptance for the notion of sexual violence as an enforceable 
war crime (likely attributable to international and regional laws and prosecutions, rather 
than SCR 1325), it is clear that the goals articulated in SCR 1325 have not consistently 
translated into practice in the field. 
IV.  Recommendations and Conclusion 
Although the will to bring women into the dialogue of processes designed around 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding has improved, the implementation and 
                                                                                                                               
 120. Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC 
Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and Their Agreements, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 941, 968–69 
(2010).  
 121. Pakistan’s Swat Gets Sharia Courts, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/03/200931715490896931.html. 
 122. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 1, ¶ 15. 
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execution of that will is still lacking. The fact that the U.N. has turned part of its focus on 
women is to be welcomed but that focus has remained largely rhetorical, and has not yet 
yielded concrete actions that fulfill the U.N.’s goals. For example, SCR 1325 has indeed 
functioned to increase the spotlight on gender security issues in the context of conflict 
endings. But people working in the field during and after conflict quickly observed that 
suggesting “the mainstreaming” of women (even while struggling with the fluidity and 
disagreement in practice over that terminology) into peace processes was entirely different 
from accomplishing such an outcome. As with many other international instruments, SCR 
1325 contains no measures of accountability, nor targets to achieve.123 Furthermore, as with 
many U.N. documents hoping to achieve wide consensus, the language was too passive and 
vague for actors in the field to understand what, exactly, was to be implemented. 
Too often, the goals articulated in the Security Council’s gender-specific resolutions utterly 
fail to take hold on the ground. When they do, they are often too short lived to be meaningful 
(such as firewood in Darfur). The primary problem seems to be a lack of uniformity on goals. 
One clear theme that emerges is that we have little understanding of what questions to ask 
in determining how to improve women’s lives and security let alone how to answer those 
questions. How are women best mainstreamed? What are their goals? How do we best achieve 
their goals? In what ways do meeting women’s security needs also improve overall security? 
How do we measure whether we have succeeded? These questions are still only infrequently 
asked and inconsistently answered. It is the answers to these questions that should provide 
the framework for developing national action plans and for country-specific resolutions. 
Adoption of SCR 1325 and its progeny does carry some potential to “change the game” of 
conflict and post-conflict processes, but that potential does not result from the resolutions’ 
legal enforceability or remedies. Rather, the real game-changing possibilities have so far 
resulted from pragmatic self-interest in the field. Wherever the U.N. operates, so do multiple 
other international and regional actors, committed (for varying reasons) to working as part of 
(or partner to, or in concert with, or as recipients of) U.N. field operations. International 
humanitarian missions, peacemaking exercises, peacekeeping operations and post-conflict 
reconstruction operations are executed and carried out not just by the U.N. and its agencies, 
but by various configurations of U.N. bodies, regional bodies, international organizations and 
NGOs. Take, for example, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which often 
operates in the field, both during and after conflict, and well into post-conflict reconstruction 
and transitional processes. UNHCR is entirely donor-funded and its donors are governments, 
international organizations (IOs), corporations and private donors.124 It rarely carries its field 
work out independently, but rather relies on and partners with NGOs, the private sector, civil 
society, departments within local governments, and refugee communities.125 All of these 
                                                                                                                               
 123. See, e.g., Otto, supra note 35, at 23. 
 124. See Donors, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c26c.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (“UNHCR relies almost 
entirely on voluntary contributions from governments, inter-governmental institutions, individuals, 
foundations and corporations.”).  
 125. Id. The U.N. refugee agency needs to work with a wide variety of donors and partners to adequately 
fulfill its role. These range from governments to non-governmental organizations, the private sector, 
civil society and refugee communities.  
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partner organizations are in turn dependent upon funding to keep their operations ongoing. 
They secure some of that funding from the UNHCR, as partner/contractors. Other U.N. 
agencies and field missions similarly partner with and fund the work of other organizations 
operating in the field. The raison d’etre of many of these partner organizations is their ability 
to operate in the field and assist in humanitarian efforts. They, in turn, receive funding from 
other donors and governments based on their ability to show that they continue to be invited 
to operate in the field and effectively partner with U.N. missions and agencies. If they fail to 
be invited to work in the field, they lose their funding and cease to exist. The U.N. field 
operations are mandated to implement SCRs 1325, 1820, 1888 and 1889, and, as a 
consequence, other international actors and donors also adopt and attempt to implement the 
principles articulated within them. Sometimes they appear to do so more effectively, more 
nimbly, and in a timelier fashion, than can the slower U.N. missions.126 
As implementation and execution of Security Council objectives continues to be 
problematic, the Security Council should consider directing U.N. agencies to more specifically 
make partnering decisions based on a determination as to which NGOs and IOs regularly 
succeed or fail in properly assessing and responding to women’s needs, pursuant to SCRs. If 
the United Nations resolutions have limited enforcement capacity on their own terms, then 
IOs and NGOs can be penalized financially for a failure to deliver on gender-based 
assessment grounds. Increased willingness by the United Nations to undertake gender-
sensitive budgeting, namely setting aside defined percentages of field and agency budgets to 
address gender-based priorities (and specifically the needs of women) is a very practical and 
highly outcome driven way to proceed, and could be usefully applied to the post-conflict 
domain. Requiring NGOs to regularly establish their gender-centric bona fides may provide 
some of the teeth necessary to implement these goals.127 
Efforts obviously must be multilateral: for governments (receiving and sending), member 
states, donors, civil society, the passage of binding laws and enforceable treaties are all 
critical to improving women’s status and security. As the SCRs only offer passive influence on 
these issues, their maximum impact is to focus the attention of donors and programmers on 
the requirements that they properly assess and attend to women’s needs, and that they 
demonstrate their successes and ameliorate their failures. The Secretary-General and U.N. 
agencies can then assess the extent to which donors, NGOs, and member states comply and 
succeed, and limit future participation in field missions to those entities best able to 
demonstrate compliance and implementation. 
SCR 1325 has succeeded in one respect. It has become the touchstone for setting the tone 
that places women’s concerns on the agenda, and it is partly responsible for the development 
of new norms for centralizing women in field missions. Where it has failed to be specific 
                                                                                                                               
 126. See, e.g., CARE INT’L, supra note 62, at 41 (articulating its recalibrated priorities for operating in the 
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 127. UN Women has moved towards gender-based budgeting, which may go some way towards creating 
this link. See, e.g., UN WOMEN, REPARATIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND GENDER: REPORT OF THE 
KAMPALA WORKSHOP 1–2 DECEMBER 2010 (2010), available at 
http://www.unrol.org/files/Kampala%20workshop%202011%20Reparations,%20Development%20an
d%20Gender.pdf. 
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enough with regard to how those concerns should be prioritized and addressed, its successor 
resolutions have added some specificity. The most promising resolution may be SCR 1889, too 
new as yet to fully demonstrate its impact, but which broadly articulates many of the 
concerns addressed in this Article: (1) women’s physical safety and inclusion alone is 
insufficient, but rather women’s voice and participation are key; (2) specific factors, such as 
education must be prioritized in order to allow for longer term security for women and for 
women’s real participation; (3) women’s concerns must be properly assessed and that specific 
funds must be earmarked for all of these activities; and (4) these needs are not only short 
term, in relation to immediate conflict-related security, but also longer term, and must 
therefore work their way into all post-conflict activities in the field. 
Observing the past decade of slow progress (Liberia), occasional backwards movement 
(Darfur), and no movement (DRC), it would be Pollyanna-ish to express high hopes for 
SCR 1889 to succeed where others have not. Yet, the potential exists for SCR 1889 to carry 
what is currently already a widely known agenda, if not one yet widely understood in terms of 
practice and implementation. As international actors begin to view conflict-to-post-conflict as 
a continuum impacting women, the resolutions continue to have a role to play in guiding 
those actors to set priorities placing women as central actors in all of these conflict-to-post-
conflict processes. 
  
